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ROTH, Circuit Judge 
Hay Group Management, Inc., appeals the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment in which it held that Hay 
Group’s claims are precluded by a final judgment issued by the 
German Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt am Main.  The 
District Court assumed that the relevant inquiry was whether 
Hay could have brought its claims as counterclaims in the 
German litigation.  But under Pennsylvania preclusion law, the 
correct question is whether Hay was required to bring its 
claims as counterclaims in the German litigation.  Pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1, we have determined that 
under German law, Hay was not required to plead its claims in 
this action as counterclaims in the German litigation.  We 
therefore hold that the District Court erred in granting 
summary judgment on the basis that Hay was precluded by 
German law from bringing this action.  Since Hay’s contract 
assignment claim seeks to functionally undo the German 
litigation, however, we will affirm the summary judgment on 
that claim, but we will reverse the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment on Hay’s sham investigation claim and 
remand that claim to the District Court.  
 
I 
This matter arises out of Bernd Schneider’s tenure and 
subsequent termination as CEO of all Hay Group companies.1  
 
1 There are numerous Hay entities, but for our purposes, three 
are relevant:  Hay Group Management, Inc., (Hay USA); Hay 
BV, (Hay Netherlands); and Hay GmbH, (Hay Germany).  The 
German litigation, at the time of final judgment, involved Hay 
Netherlands and Hay Germany.  The District Court held that 
4 
Schneider, a longtime Hay employee, was elevated to CEO in 
2001, succeeding Chris Matthews, who stayed on as Chairman 
of Hay Group.  Schneider’s employment contract was signed 
with Hay Netherlands and allowed  Hay Netherlands to assign 
the contract to another Hay entity for tax purposes.  
 
Schneider was unhappy with the bonus of $850,000 that 
he was awarded for 2002, his first full year as CEO.  He had an 
associate, Lucie Boller-Bockius, transfer funds for his bonus 
using an unusually favorable conversion rate which bumped 
the dollar value of the bonus up to $1,000,000, the amount that 
Schneider thought he deserved.  He also drastically increased 
Boller-Bockius’s direct compensation and her severance 
package.  As a result, Schneider became involved in a 
protracted dispute with Stephen Kaye, the CFO of Hay Group.  
Schneider was forced to return the excess bonus, but he then 
engaged a law firm to investigate Kaye.  When concerns about 
the aggressiveness of this investigation reached Matthews, he 
terminated the investigation on November 10, 2003, and 
retained another law firm to conduct an investigation.  This 
second investigation determined that the claims against Kaye 
were unfounded.  After these events, when Hay Group 
discovered that Boller-Bockius had left her job and was 
claiming an inflated pension, Hay Germany and Hay 




Hay Group is in privity with Hay Netherlands; however, that 
holding was not appealed.  As a result, it is not necessary to 
further discuss the Hay entities’ corporate structure in order to 
resolve this appeal.  
5 
As a result, Schneider sued Hay Germany and Hay 
Netherlands in the Labor Court of Germany, contesting his 
termination.2  In 2005, on the basis that his contract had not 
been assigned to Hay Germany, Schneider brought a new 
action in the Netherlands, seeking a determination that Hay 
Netherlands violated Dutch law in firing him.  The Dutch 
courts found that under Dutch law there had been no valid Hay 
Netherlands resolution, approving Schneider’s termination.  
Schneider then returned to the German litigation, arguing that, 
because there had been no assignment, Dutch law applied to 
his firing.  The German courts sought clarification from courts 
in the Netherlands regarding whether Schneider’s contract had 
been validly assigned under Dutch law; the Dutch courts 
concluded that it had not been assigned.  On September 19, 
2012, the German trial court issued an opinion dismissing 
Schneider’s claims and sustaining the Hay entities’ sole 
counterclaim, which related to Boller-Bockius’s 
compensation.   
 
The German Higher Regional Court reversed in part on 
February 19, 2014.  Unlike the lower court, the higher court 
gave preclusive effect to the Dutch court’s finding that the 
contract had not been assigned.  The German higher court 
relied on this failure to assign Schneider’s contract to sustain 
many of his arguments on appeal.  As a result, the Hay entities 
were required to pay Schneider over $13 million.  While the 
investigation into Stephen Kaye was mentioned in the German 
 
2 Hay Group was initially a party to the suit, but it and other 
Hay entities were dismissed in 2010 for lack of international 
jurisdiction.  The case was later transferred to the Regional 
Court of Frankfurt, which rendered the 2012 decision 
discussed below.  
6 
higher court’s decision, the court explicitly declined to rely on 
it.  Instead, the court focused its 122-page decision on 
Schneider’s conduct surrounding Boller-Bockius’s salary and 
pension.   
 Hay Group filed this suit on March 22, 2004, in the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging nine causes of action 
with varying degrees of overlap with the German litigation.  
Because of the pendency of the German litigation, the District 
Court stayed this action in its entirety on April 28, 2005.  After 
the German proceedings became final, the District Court lifted 
the stay on September 2, 2014, directed the filing of an 
amended complaint, and dismissed the claims against Boller-
Bockius with prejudice.  The second amended complaint, filed 
on June 7, 2016, is the operative pleading at this time.  
 
 The second amended complaint alleges two causes of 
action:  first, that Schneider took numerous actions that 
breached his fiduciary and legal duty to the board, and, second, 
that Schneider conspired to defraud and harm Hay Group.  
These claims are based on allegations that Schneider (1) 
retained outside counsel and used the Hay entities’ funds to try 
to remove Stephen Kaye; (2) initiated and controlled a sham 
investigation in concert with others, impeding an impartial 
review into the allegations against Kaye; (3) interfered with the 
contract assignment, which caused the Dutch and German 
courts to hold Schneider’s termination was invalid under Dutch 
law; and (4) manipulated salaries and bonuses in order to 
entrench his power. 
 
Schneider filed for summary judgment on April 28, 
2017, arguing that (1) the contract assignment claims were 
7 
precluded,3 (2) the remaining fiduciary duty claims were 
barred by the business judgment rule, and (3) the civil 
conspiracy claim could not survive without the other fiduciary 
duty claims.  Hay Group, in response, contested preclusion and 
claimed that sufficient evidence existed to allow a jury to find 
that Schneider was operating in bad faith on both the fiduciary 
duty and conspiracy claims.  Both parties submitted expert 
declarations of German law to the District Court.  
 
The District Court granted summary judgment for 
Schneider.  In dismissing each of the claims, the District Court 
relied entirely on the res judicata argument that Schneider had 
advanced exclusively with respect to the contract assignment, 
determining that it did not need to reach the other issues.  
 
II4 
Hay Group raises two theories it believes are not 
precluded by the German litigation:  the contract assignment 
claim and the claim relating to the investigation of Stephen 
 
3 Schneider provided six additional theories for dismissal of 
the contract assignment claim, but as we affirm the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment on this claim, we do not 
need to address them.  
4 The District Court had alienage jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(a)(2), as Hay Group is a Delaware corporation and 
Schneider is a citizen of Germany.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a grant of summary 
judgment de novo.  Simpson v. Att’y Gen., 913 F.3d 110, 113 
(3d Cir. 2019). 
8 
Kaye.5  Schneider counters that these claims arise out of the 
same cause of action and are thus precluded.  Since this case 
arises under alienage jurisdiction, we must determine whether 
these claims are precluded under Pennsylvania law.6  
Pennsylvania intermediate courts have adopted section 
22 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments,7 which reads as 
follows:  
 
(1) Where the defendant may 
interpose a claim as a counterclaim 
but he fails to do so, he is not 
thereby precluded from 
subsequently maintaining an 
action on that claim, except as 
stated in Subsection (2).  
(2) A defendant who may 
interpose a claim as a counterclaim 
in an action but fails to do so is 
precluded, after the rendition of 
 
5 Hay Group’s civil conspiracy claims are not based on these 
facts, so we will treat the civil conspiracy claims as not raised 
on appeal.   
6 See Otos Tech Co. Ltd. v. OGK Am., Inc., 653 F.3d 310, 
312–13 (3d Cir. 2011) (applying New Jersey state law to a 
question of whether to grant full faith and credit to a Korean 
judgment).  
7 Del Turco v. Peoples Home Sav. Ass’n, 478 A.2d 456, 463 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (first adoption); accord Rearick v. 
Elderton State Bank, 97 A.3d 374, 384–85 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2014).  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has not reached 
the question of whether counterclaims not brought elsewhere 
are subject to the Restatement.  
9 
judgment in that action, from 
maintaining an action on the claim 
if:  
  (a) The counterclaim is required 
to be interposed by a compulsory 
counterclaim statute or rule of 
court, or 
  (b) The relationship between the 
counterclaim and the plaintiff’s 
claim is such that successful 
prosecution of the second action 
would nullify the initial judgment 
or would impair rights established 
in the initial action.8  
As section 22(2)(a) makes clear, the operative question is 
whether Hay Group was required to bring its counterclaim in 
the German litigation, a question of foreign law.  Under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1, the law of foreign countries is to 
be treated by our federal courts as a question of law rather than 
 
8 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 22 (1980).  
10 
a fact to be proven.9  Our review of the District Court is 
therefore de novo.10  
The District Court correctly identified a facial 
disagreement between the parties’ expert reports on the 
question of whether Hay Group’s counterclaim was required to 
be brought in Germany.  The Hay Group expert, Dr. 
Fischinger, stated that in the German courts “there is no legal 
rule of compulsory counterclaim” and that “a plaintiff is free 
to either (i) file a counterclaim (‘Widerklage’) or (ii) sue the 
plaintiff in a completely different lawsuit in the same or a 
different court.”11  Schneider’s expert, Dr. Thees, instead noted 
that “all counter claims against a claim are made by the 
defendant prior to the last oral hearing in the court of first 
instance in order to avoid that such counter claims are barred 
(‘präkludiert’)” and that counterclaims “can only be considered 
by the court of second instance if the relevant party can prove 
 
9 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1 (“The court’s determination must 
be treated as a ruling on a question of law.”); Arthur R. Miller, 
Federal Rule 44.1 and the “Fact” Approach to Determining 
Foreign Law: Death Knell for a Die-Hard Doctrine, 65 Mich. 
L. Rev. 613, 661 (1967) (“[I]t must be remembered that one of 
the policies inherent in Rule 44.1 is that, whenever possible, 
foreign-law issues should be resolved on their merits and on 
the basis of a full evaluation of the available materials.”); see 
also Matthew J. Ahn, Note, 44.1 Luftballons: The 
Communication Breakdown of Foreign Law in the Federal 
Courts, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1343, 1353–61 (2014) (noting, 
consistent with the purpose of Rule 44.1, proactive and sua 
sponte determinations and redeterminations of foreign law).  
10 Ferrostaal, Inc. v. M/V Sea Phoenix, 447 F.3d 212, 216 (3d 
Cir. 2006).  
11 App. 2038. 
11 
that it did not act negligently by not asserting the means of 
defense earlier.”12  Rather than resolving this dispute of law, 
though, the District Court found that the reports agreed that 
Hay Group could have raised its current claims as 
counterclaims in the German litigation and deemed the entire 
action precluded.  This was error.  
 
We must, therefore, address the dispute over German 
law and determine whether Hay Group was required to bring 
its counterclaims in the German litigation.13  Secondary 
sources unequivocally agree that German defendants are not 
required to file any counterclaims within the same suit.  “In 
German . . . law the matter [of allowing counterclaims] is left 
to the discretion of the court.”14  Legal systems outside the 
United States “do not expressly provide for compulsory 
counterclaims, except in specialized proceedings . . .; in all 
other cases a respondent who failed to bring a counterclaim is 
not precluded from doing so in the future because of the effect 
of res judicata of a judgment concerning the plaintiff’s 
claim.”15  “The German code, ZPO § 322(1), specifies:  
‘Judgments are able to attain legal force only insofar as they 
decide the demand raised by the complaint or counterclaim,’” 
which indicates that preclusive effect does not attach to 
 
12 App. 18. 
13 In resolving this dispute, “the court is not limited by 
material presented by the parties; it may engage in its own 
research and consider any relevant material thus found.”  
Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 44.1. 
14 Constantine Antonopoulos, Counterclaims Before the 
International Court of Justice 11 (2011).  
15 Id. at 12.  
12 
counterclaims not actually raised.16  Dr. Fischinger’s report 
also cites to numerous judicial and secondary sources that 
support this conclusion.17  We hold, therefore, that German law 
did not require Hay Group to file a counterclaim.  Thus, Hay 
Group is not precluded from maintaining this action under 
section 22(2)(a).18  
Our inquiry, however, does not end there.  Section 
22(2)(b) of the Restatement requires us to consider whether the 
 
16 Kevin M. Clermont, Res Judicata as Requisite for Justice, 
68 Rutgers U. L. Rev. 1067, 1096 n.105 (2016) (quoting Oscar 
G. Chase et al., Civil Litigation in Comparative Context 461 
(2007)). 
17 App. 2038–39 (“A duty to file a counterclaim neither 
follows from [ZPO] § 261 . . . nor from any other statutory 
provision.” (quoting Karsten Otte, Umfassende 
Streitentscheidung durch Beachtung von 
Sachzusammenhängen 234 (1998))). 
18 While this appears directly contrary to Dr. Thees’s 
unequivocal statement that claims not raised are barred, an 
apparent definition resolves this tension.  Dr. Thees 
specifically notes that a “court of second instance” is typically 
barred from considering counterclaims, App. 18, but a court of 
second instance usually refers to an appellate court, not a court 
considering a second suit.  Court of Second Instance, Oxford 
Reference, 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.2
0110810104700526 (last visited April 1, 2019) (“A court 
exercising jurisdiction to rehear a case de novo (see rehearing), 
or its appellate jurisdiction to hear an appeal, from the court of 
first instance in which the matter originated. See also court of 
last resort.”).  Read in this manner, Dr. Thees’s statements are 
inapplicable and thus irrelevant to the instant case.  
13 
German litigation would be nullified if Hay Group prevailed in 
the instant action.  In the case of Hay Group’s contract 
assignment claim, the answer is clearly yes.  Hay Group’s 
theory is that Schneider interfered with the contract 
assignment, rendering the assignment, and Schneider’s 
subsequent termination, invalid.19  Their requested relief on the 
contract assignment claim is exactly the amount for which the 
Hay entities were liable to Schneider in the German litigation.  
If Hay Group should prevail on this claim, it would clearly 
nullify the German judgment.  Therefore, under section 
22(2)(b), Hay Group’s contract assignment claim is still 
precluded.   
 
Hay Group argues that the discovery of the relevant 
facts did not occur until after the German litigation started; 
thus, those facts cannot be precluded.  This argument is 
inconsistent with the principles of finality and comity that 
underlie the doctrine of preclusion.  To the extent that newly 
discovered facts might call into question the German judgment, 
the Hay entities are limited to the collateral attacks that may 
exist in the German legal system.  Those options cannot be 
expanded through a suit in the American courts.   
 
 
19 App. 132 ¶ 104 (“As a result of Schneider’s breach of his 
fiduciary duty to Hay Management to ensure that his 
employment agreement was assigned by [Hay Netherlands] to 
Hay German, Hay Management became the Hay Group entity 
responsible for the vast majority of the judgment in the German 
litigation, and thus had to pay $13,794,591.37, while 
Schneider, who breached his fiduciary duties, benefited by a 
similar amount.”)  
14 
The sham investigation claim is a different matter.  The 
German court did not rely on the sham investigation of Kaye 
in its 2014 decision, which focused on the salary manipulation 
charges involving Boller-Bockius and others.  The amount in 
controversy under this claim is a combination of costs for the 
law firm conducting the sham investigation as well as lost 
productivity, costs that were never an issue in the German 
litigation.  This claim therefore does not seek to nullify the 
German judgment or impair rights established by it.  Therefore, 
Hay Group’s sham investigation claim is not precluded. 
 
III 
Hay Group’s sham investigation claim must still 
independently survive summary judgment.  Schneider moved 
for summary judgment on the basis that the Delaware Business 
Judgment Rule barred the sham investigation claim.20  A party 
moving for summary judgment must demonstrate that there is 
no genuine dispute of material fact.21  Under the business 
judgment rule, such a dispute includes whether Schneider 
“breached [his] fiduciary duty of care or of loyalty or acted in 
 
20 Schneider also moved for summary judgment on the theory 
that Pennsylvania law requires Hay Group to quantify its 
damages and that Hay Group did not sufficiently do so.  
However, Hay Group quantified the fees paid to the first law 
firm as a result of the sham investigation as roughly $83,000, 
which is sufficiently specific to survive summary judgment.  
21 Bland v. City of Newark, 900 F.3d 77, 83 (3d Cir. 2018).  
When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, all 
reasonable inferences are to be made in favor of the nonmoving 
party.  Nat’l Amusements Inc. v. Borough of Palmyra, 716 F.3d 
57, 62 (3d Cir. 2013).  
15 
bad faith.”22  There are numerous facts here that directly call 
into question whether Schneider acted in bad faith in handling 
the investigation.  Schneider’s dispute with Kaye resulted from 
a series of actions Schneider took to allegedly enrich himself 
and Boller-Bockius at the expense of the Hay entities.  Hay 
Group contends that the claims against Kaye which were being 
investigated were all unfounded and in many cases factually 
inconsistent; this supports a potential inference of bad faith.  
The parties also genuinely dispute whether Schneider, over a 
contrary recommendation, chose the initial law firm to 
investigate Kaye.  There are sufficient disputes of fact to make 
an award of summary judgment inappropriate on the question 
of Schneider’s bad faith.  We will remand this claim to the 
District Court for further proceedings. 
 
IV 
Because section 22 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments does not bar Hay Group’s sham investigation claim 
and because that claim can survive Schneider’s motion for 
summary judgment, we will partially vacate the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment and remand the sham 
investigation claim for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion; we will affirm the grant of summary judgment of the 
contract assignment claim. 
 
22 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 
(Del. 2006).  
